Introduction 5 6
In classic decision-making theories, the presence of explicit outcomes or feedback after 5 7 choice selections is considered a crucial source of information for behavioral adaptability and 5 8 belief updating, e.g. by triggering prediction error signals (Rangel et al., 2008; Glimcher, probability of 80%, for the predominant value, and 10% for each of the remaining outcomes. A second message on screen also signaled the amount won on white screen (fixed interval: 1 3 2 0.5 seconds), followed by a fixation cross (variable interval: 1-2.5 seconds), which would 1 3 3 precede a new trial. The total amount of points accumulated, per block, was always displayed 1 3 4 in the lower part of the screen. Finally, the participants were instructed that the computer would randomly change the jar 1 3 7 from which it extracted beads, or the card-value associations. The pace of these pseudo-1 3 8 random changes was determined in an interval of 5 to 7 trials for both tasks and it was 1 3 9 independent of the performance of the participants. For both tasks, participants were 1 4 0 compensated with $1 for every 500 points, selecting the points accumulated during one 1 4 1 random block per task. Both tasks consisted in 3 blocks of 71 trials each, so the participants 1 4 2 were told that the maximum amount of bonus they could gain consisted in about $15 dollars 1 4 3 from each task. Three identical sequences -one per block-were used for all subjects, for both 1 4 4 the bead colors and the card-value associations. Task order and block order were used two similar Bayesian models to estimate: 1) in the bead task, the probability that the 1 5 0 latest color bead had been extracted from the selected jar; 2) in the card task, the probability 1 5 1 that the selected card was associated with the 100 value, given the outcomes received from 1 5 2 the previous choices. In both cases, we used a standard Bayes theorem in the context of We used a Monte Carlo method to estimate the value of the parameter σ , per each task, that 1 7 2 would better match real choice selections expressed by the 28 participants. We then coupled 1 7 3 the trial-by-trial distribution of probabilities resulting from these model-based estimations probability to reach the desired outcome (i.e. the estimated probability to guess the correct 1 7 7 extraction jar or the card associated with 100 points) and therefore was used as a parametric 1 7 8 modulator for the analysis of confidence. The inverse 1-p, indicating the estimated 1 7 9 probability to receive any outcome but the desired one, given the chosen action, was used as 1 8 0 parametric modulator of uncertainty. consent was obtained from all subjects and all participants were informed that they could 1 8 8
withdraw from the study at any point. Amg and mPFC, limited to the bead task, due to lack of convergence across hemispheres and 2 5 7 insufficient difference between the compared families. mean behavioral prediction accuracy of 85.75%±4.73% for the bead task and 75.93%±6.44% 2 6 4
for the card task. In the context of our study, we defined confidence as the estimated probability to succeed in 2 6 7 securing the desired outcome (p), and uncertainty as the inverse probability (1-p), given a Specifically, the model was used to estimate, on a trial-by-trial basis, each participant's 2 7 0 confidence (p) that their selected jar was the extraction jar (bead task) or their selected card 2 7 1 was associated with the maximum reward (card task). A subject by subject correlation 2 7 2 analysis revealed this estimated confidence (p) was negatively correlated with the reaction 2 7 3 times (RTs) in the bead task (r= -.43 ± .16; P=.01 ± .05), but not in the card task (r= -.01 ± 2 7 4 .11; P=.33 ± .31; cf. Fig. 1D and E). Next, we included RTs values as covariates and we (p) ( Fig. 1D,E and Dehaene, 2017), we found that uncertainty was encoded in bilateral anterior insula, insula-to-ACC [exceedance probability for bead task: 94% (left hemisphere), 67% (right connections from the anterior hippocampus to other regions in the bead task (aHip-to-mPFC: outcome was absent. In contrast, when feedback was available, confidence primarily 2 9 7 modulated mPFC-to-aHip, mPFC-to-Amg, and Amg-to-aHip connectivity (exceedance 2 9 8 probability, left hemisphere: 95% and 81%, and 82%, Fig. 4D ). increases as the other decreases. Our findings reveal a more complex and nuanced picture,
demonstrating that the relationship between uncertainty and confidence is not the same across 3 0 4
all Marrian levels of analysis (Marr and Poggio, 1976) . Specifically, despite the fact we 3 0 5 defined uncertainty and confidence as computationally symmetric processes (i.e. model-3 0 6 estimated p and 1-p), we found asymmetry and divergence in the implementation of these 3 0 7
estimations in terms of neural network dynamics. In our tasks, both confidence-and 3 0 8
uncertainty-encoding neural regions remain unchanged, i.e. they are independent from the 3 0 9
task frame. Both tasks presented similar action-outcome volatility, implying that different 3 1 0 sources of information (colored beads vs. card/money) were used by the same neural areas were also not affected by the source of information available. Specifically, we found that the 3 1 5
anterior insula drove the uncertainty-encoding network and exerted its directed influence over ubiquitous salience network (Seeley et al., 2007) . This network also responds to any threat to 3 2 0 homeostasis, as, for instance, in the case of information conflicting with established beliefs, 3 2 1 which seems to be independent of the nature of such information (Gu and FitzGerald, 2014).
2 2
In this sense, our finding of the insula driving uncertainty computations across tasks is 3 2 3 consistent with its role in salience processing and belief updating (Gu and FitzGerald, 2014;
Uddin, 2015), demonstrating that the brain monitors conflicting information in action-3 2 5 outcome contingencies, even in the absence of immediate outcomes. In sharp contrast, we found that the directional influence among brain regions encoding 3 2 8 confidence in action-outcome contingencies changed depending on the availability of explicit 3 2 9
outcomes and the source of available information. As confidence encoding in the bead task
relies on the sequence of colored beads as evidence, we speculate that this process engages This is an intriguing decoupling of the network implementation for confidence and alternative available is the correct choice to make. Second, despite the significant increase in rely on a simple set of rules, easy-to-compute stochastic associations (80% for the most 3 4 8 prevalent bead in a jar and for the most likely outcome value associated to a card) and only 3 4 9 three types of discrete evidence (i.e. the three feedback values or the three bead colors), (for the confidence network). Thus, even in those cases reporting lower values for the Finally, it can be argued that, in terms of active inference, this dissociation we found between being pursued (that depends upon prior preferences). This dissociation also fits comfortably 3 6 8 with the functional anatomy described above. Taken together, our findings reveal both the computing confidence, but not uncertainty. References: 3  7  7   A  d  a  m  s  R  A  ,  H  u  y  s  Q  J  ,  R  o  i  s  e  r  J  P  (  2  0  1  6  )  C  o  m  p  u  t  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  P  s  y  c  h  i  a  t  r  y  :  t  o  w  a  r  d  s  a  m  a  t  h  e  m  a  t  i  c  a  l  l  y  i  n  f  o  r  m  e  d  3  7  8  u  n  d  e  r  s  t  a  n  d  i  n  g  o  f  m  e  n  t  a  l  i  l  l  n  e  s  s  .  J  N  e  u  r  o  l  N  e  u  r  o  s  u  r  g  P  s  y  c  h  i  a  t  r  y  8  7  :  5  3  -6  3  .  3  7  9 A y  n  i  e  l  F  ,  S  i  g  m  a  n  M  ,  M  a  i  n  e  n  Z  F  (  2  0  1  5  a  )  C  o  n  f  i  d  e  n  c  e  a  s  B  a  y  e  s  i  a  n  P  r  o  b  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  :  F  r  o  m  N  e  u  r  a  l  O  r  i  g  i  n  s  t  o  4  2  7  B  e  h  a  v  i  o  r  .  N  e  u  r  o  n  8  8  :  7  8  -9  2  .  4  2  8  M  e  y  n  i  e  l  F  ,  S  c  h  l  u  n  e  g  g  e  r  D  ,  D  e  h  a  e  n  e  S  (  2  0  1  5  b  )  T  h  e  S  e  n  s  e  o  f  C  o  n  f  i  d  e  n  c  e  d  u  r  i  n  g  P  r  o  b  a  b  i  l  i  s  t  i  c  L  e  a  r  n  i  n  g  :  4  2  9  A  N  o  r  m  a  t  i  v  e  A  c  c  o  u  n  t  .  P  L  o  S  C  o  m  p  u  t  B  i  o  l  1  1  :  e  1  0  0  4  3  0  5  .  4  3  0  M  o  r  r  i  s  s  J  ,  G  e  l  l  M  ,  v  a  n  R  e  e  k  u  m  C  M  (  2  0  1  8  )  T  h  e  u  n  c  e  r  t  a  i  n  b  r  a  i  n  :  A  c  o  -o  r  d  i  n  a  t  e  b  a  s  e  d  m  e  t  a  -a  n  a  l  y  s  i  s  o  f  4  3  1 
